Benedict Wisco, RN, MAN (contributor)
Introduction
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) believed that we have a clear moral
responsibility to be truthful. For Kant, our human reason makes moral demands
on our lives. If we think rationally about how we should behave, then we will
immediately see that some kinds of actions are unreasonable. Dishonesty in all
of its forms, he argues, is fundamentally unreasonable. Many philosophers
before Kant also said that morality is linked to the rational part of human
nature. But Kant goes a step further and formulates a supreme rational
principle that tells us precisely whether a specific action is right or wrong.
He calls this principle the categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim by
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
According to the categorical imperative, it is wrong for me to be deceitful
since I couldn’t reasonably want everyone to act in that way. He explains this
with the example of breaking one’s promise: “if no man were to keep his
promise. . . . then promises would in the long run become useless.” So, it is
unreasonable for me to wish this fate on humanity. If the categorical
imperative succeeds as a true test of moral conduct, then it is the most
important contribution to moral philosophy ever. All moral controversies would
be quickly resolved, and no one could claim ignorance about their moral
obligations.
Biography
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the central figure
in modern philosophy. He synthesized early modern rationalism and empiricism,
set the terms for much of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy, and
continues to exercise a significant influence today in metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, and other fields. The
fundamental idea of Kant's “critical philosophy” especially in his three
Critiques: the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787), the Critique of Practical
Reason (1788), and the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) — is human
autonomy. He argues that the human understanding is the source of the general laws
of nature that structure all our experience; and that human reason gives itself
the moral law, which is our basis for belief in God, freedom, and immortality.
Therefore, scientific knowledge, morality, and religious belief are mutually
consistent and secure because they all rest on the same foundation of human
autonomy, which is also the final end of nature according to the teleological
worldview of reflecting judgment that Kant introduces to unify the theoretical
and practical parts of his philosophical system.
The Concept of Categorical
Imperative
Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the
practical reason of any rational being understands the categorical imperative
to be: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law." That is, each individual
agent regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way
that everyone (including itself) will always act according to the same general
rule in the future. This expression of the moral law, Kant maintained,
provides a concrete, practical method for evaluating particular human actions
of several distinct varieties.
The Formula of the Law of Nature
So much for the psychology behind the categorical imperative but the
most important part of Kant’s theory is the categorical imperative itself:
“Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.”
The categorical imperative offers us a step-by-step procedure for
determining the moral status of particular actions. First, I take a specific
action, such as stealing my neighbor’s lawnmower. Second, I see what the
guiding principle or “maxim” is behind the action, such as “I will steal my
neighbor’s lawnmower to gain material wealth.” Third, I reflect on what that
maxim would be like if it were a universal rule that everyone followed, such as
“Everyone may steal his or her neighbor’s lawnmower to gain material wealth.”
Fourth, if the universal rule is reasonable, then I accept the action as moral;
if unreasonable, I reject the action as immoral. It is almost like asking “What
would happen if everyone did this?” However, we don’t want to consider what
happens regarding our selfish inclinations, such as whether a universal rule
would make me happy or not. Instead, we only want to look at what happens in
our reasoning process as we think about a universal rule. Kant has a specific
notion of reason in mind, with specific indicators about when a rule is
rational or irrational. Kant gives four formulations of the categorical
imperative that reflect different facets of human rationality.
The
first and most famous formulation is sometimes called the Formula of the Law of
Nature: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature.” The wording of this is very close to that of the
original statement of the categorical imperative. However, as Kant explains,
the distinguishing feature here is that we consider whether our maxim could
function as a law of nature—and specifically, whether it is free from
contradiction. Suppose I tell you that gravity will make the rock in my right
hand fall to the ground and will at the same time make the rock in my left hand
hover in mid-air. You will think that this is impossible since laws of nature
cannot be inconsistent like this. Similarly, this formula of the categorical
imperative instructs us to search for a contradiction within a universalized
maxim.
To
illustrate, Kant gives four examples that he thinks represent our main types of
moral duties. The clearest of the four examples is this: Suppose I borrow money
from you promising to return it later, but I know full well that I will not
return it. The intended maxim or guiding principle behind my action is this:
“Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to
pay it back, though I know that this will never be done.” Kant then explains
that a contradiction arises once I view this maxim as a universal rule.
Specifically, if such deceit were followed universally, then the whole
institution of promising would be undermined and I couldn’t make my promise to
begin with. So, on the one hand, I state “I promise such and such” yet, on the
other, once universalized the practice of promise keeping itself would be
nonexistent.
In
another example, Kant explains why it is wrong for me to kill myself when
misfortunes push me to the point of despair. The maxim of this action is “From
self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance
threatens more evil than it promises pleasure.” But a law of nature of this
sort would be contradictory. The self-love principle inclines me to preserve my
life, but according to this maxim, it also inclines me to end my life. In a
third example, Kant explains why I must develop my talents rather than let them
waste away. The maxim of the contrary action might be something like “I will
let my talents decay and devote my life to idleness.” Kant concedes that this
maxim by itself isn’t contradictory since in theory everyone could become an
idle slug. However, the contradiction emerges when I willfully assert this
maxim while at the same time acknowledging my inherent rational obligation to
develop my talents. In a final example, Kant explains why it is wrong to be
uncharitable. The maxim of this action might be “I will not help someone in
need.” Similar to the last example, a contradiction arises when I willfully
assert this maxim while at the same time acknowledging my inherent rational
obligation to receive charity when I am in need.
From
these four examples, two different types of contradictions emerge. The first
example in particular involves an internal contradiction within the proposed
universal rule; the last two involve a contradiction between the proposed
universal rule and another inherently rational obligation. The important point,
though, is that a particular maxim fails as a universal law of nature if a contradiction
arises at some point once a maxim is universalized.
The Formula of the End in itself
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is called the
Formula of the End in itself: “Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” In other words, we
should not use people as means to an ends, as objects, but instead recognize
the inherent dignity and value that we all have. It helps to understand Kant’s
point if we distinguish between things that have merely instrumental value
and things that have inherent value. Some things in life are
valuable only as instruments to obtain something else. My car keys, for
example, are very valuable to me, and when I lose them, my life grinds to a
halt. But my car keys are valuable only as tools that perform a task—namely,
the task of starting my car. Even the value of my car itself is mainly
instrumental insofar as it allows me to get from one place to another. By
contrast, other things in life are inherently valuable, and we appreciate them
for what they are, and not for what they enable us to do. Companionship and the
enjoyment of music are good examples. We don’t think of these as being
instruments for any further benefit, but instead appreciate them for what they
are in and of themselves.
Kant
believes that human beings have inherent value and should never be treated as
instruments:
In so acting man reduces himself to a thing, to an instrument of animal
amusement. We are, however, as human beings, not things but persons, and by
turning ourselves into things we dishonor human nature in our own persons.
The reason humans have inherent value, according to Kant, is because,
unlike animals, we have the ability to rise above our brute instincts and to
freely make crucial decisions in shaping our lives and the world around us.
This ability to freely make such decisions is a feature of our human reason,
and it confers on us an inherent dignity that is valuable in and of itself. We
have a moral responsibility, then, to treat people in ways that reflect their
inherent value, and not to reduce people to mere objects of instrumental value.
So, when I treat someone as an end, I respect her inherent value;
and when I treat someone as a means, I see her as having only
instrumental value.
Kant
explains that there is both a negative and positive component to this formula.
The negative component is that we should avoid treating people
as a mere means. But this tells us only to abstain from using people as
instruments, which is a bare minimum obligation. The positive component is that
we should undertake to treat people as an end in themselves.
This tells us to actively assist or support others in retaining their dignity.
It isn’t enough simply to avoid abusing people; we must go a step further and
help them, especially when misfortune strikes them.
Kant
again illustrates this formula with the same four examples that we considered
earlier. If I make a deceitful promise to you with the intention of acquiring
financial gain, then I’m treating you as a thing or instrument and not
recognizing your inherent value. If I commit suicide, then I am using myself as
a means to attain a tolerable state of affairs until the point that I’m
actually dead. If I let my talents decline, then I am not acknowledging my
inherent worth as a rational person who shapes the world through my decisions;
I’m not treating myself as an end. And if I fail to help people in need, then I
am not helping them maintain their dignity; I’m failing to treat them as an
end. The first two examples illustrate the negative obligation to avoid
treating people as a means, and the last two illustrate the positive obligation
to undertake treating people as an end.
Kant’s first two formulations of the categorical imperative are the most famous
of the four and he devotes the most attention to these. The remaining two
formulations draw from the central points of both the first and second
formulations. The third is the formula of autonomy: “So act that your will can
regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims.” The
focus of this formula is the authority that rests within our human will to
productively shape the world around us when following reason. As we act, we
should consider whether our intended maxims are worthy of our status as shapers
of the world.
The
fourth formulation is the formula of the kingdom of ends: “So act as if you
were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.” The point
here is that the moral fate of all people hangs together. We saw that Kant
thinks of human beings as ends in themselves, and so, collectively, we are a
“kingdom of ends” or, more simply, a moral community. As I act, I should
consider whether my actions contribute to or detract from the moral community.
Specifically, I should consider whether the intended maxim of my action could
productively function as a universal rule in the moral community.
To
summarize, here are the main points of Kant’s theory:
• Motives behind true moral choices are not those of selfish inclination
but instead those of a rational duty conforming to the categorical imperative.
• Hypothetical imperatives have the form “If you want some thing,
then you must do some act”; the categorical imperative mandates,
“You must do some act.”
• The general formula of the categorical imperative has us consider
whether the intended maxim of our action would be reasonable as a universal
law.
• Specific formulations of the categorical imperative focus on a
particular feature of human rationality, such as the absence of contradiction,
free choice, and inherent dignity.
Criticism of Kant’s Theory
Kant was an original thinker not only
in the field of ethics but in virtually every area of philosophy. His
reputation skyrocketed during the last two decades of his life, and during the
nineteenth century his writings were more influential in Europe than those of
any other philosopher. Many philosophers adopted his theories and perpetuated a
specialized Kantian vocabulary. Others, however, were less happy with Kant’s
elaborate philosophical system and picked away at parts of it, including the
categorical imperative.
A. Schopenhauer’s Criticism: The
Categorical Imperative Reduces to Egoism
Kant’s writings were a source of
inspiration for German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Although
Schopenhauer followed Kant in many particulars, he criticizes different aspects
of Kant’s philosophy that don’t quite mesh with his own. This includes Kant’s
categorical imperative. For Schopenhauer, Kant’s categorical imperative simply
reduces to the egoistic principle that “I shouldn’t do to others what I don’t
want done to myself.”
To explain, Schopenhauer believes that human conduct is guided sometimes by
sympathy for other people and other times by selfish or egoistic concerns for
oneself. Truly moral conduct, he argues, must be sympathetic, but Kant denied
the role of sympathy as the motive behind truly moral action. Sympathy is a
fellow feeling or sense of commiseration that we have with other people. Like
other feeling such as happiness and self-love sympathy focuses on specific
people and specific situations. All such feelings, Kant says, are too unstable
and unreliable to be an effective foundation for morality. According to
Schopenhauer, if I shun my feelings of sympathy as Kant recommends then egoism
will drive how I consider the universal implications of my actions in the
categorical imperative. Without sympathy, the real step-by-step
procedure of the categorical imperative is this: (1) I consider how willing I
am to allow the egoism of others to encroach on my territory, and then (2) I
recognize that this is as far as I can allow my own egoism to encroach on other
people’s territory. Schopenhauer makes this point here:
This aim [concerning the well-being of
all], however, still always remains [egoistic] well-being. I then find that all
can be equally well off only if each makes the egoism of others the limit of
his own. It naturally follows from this that I ought not to injure anyone, so
that, since the principle is assumed to be universal, I also may not be
injured. This, however, is the only ground on account of which I, not yet
possessing a moral principle but only looking for one, can desire this to be a
universal law. But obviously in this way the desire for well-being, in other
words egoism, remains the source of this ethical principle. [The World as
Will and Representation, Vol. 1, appendix]
For Schopenhauer, morality begins with
my egoistic desire for my own well-being, which I then universalize into a
principle that aims at the well-being of everyone.
Schopenhauer believes that this is good enough for the purpose of establishing
political laws that regulate how we behave as citizens, since political laws
mainly limit how much we can encroach on other people’s territory. However,
Schopenhauer argues, this is not sufficient for establishing moral obligations
that go beyond the bare minimum obligations that we find in legal codes. For
example, morality may require that we more aggressively help others in need,
and egoism is inadequate for that task. For this we need sympathy.
How might we defend Kant from Schopenhauer’s charge of egoism? For the sake of
argument, let’s suppose that Schopenhauer is correct that either something like
sympathy or something like egoism must be the driving force behind our
consideration of the universal implications of our actions. Even though Kant
rejects a specific notion of sympathy that is, sympathy as a feeling toward
particular people he still believes that there is a humanitarian emphasis
within human reason. Although reason cannot directly instruct me to sympathize
with this or that person, it does instruct me to sympathize with the whole race
of humans. This more generalized notion of sympathy emerges in the Formula of
the End in Itself, which tells us to respect the inherent value of all people.
We’ve seen that this formula includes the positive mandate to treat people as
ends in themselves by helping them when in need. This goes beyond the purely
negative mandate to avoid treating people as a means or using them as an
instrument. This reflects Schopenhauer’s precise point that there is more to
morality than simply not encroaching on other people’s territory. The solution,
then, to Schopenhauer’s egoistic spin on the categorical imperative is to
accept a more generalized notion of sympathy toward humanity.
B. Hegel’s Criticism: The Categorical
Imperative has no Practical Application
A second early criticism of the
categorical imperative is that by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770–1831). Like Schopenhauer, Hegel too focuses on the Formula of the
Law of Nature: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your
will a universal law of nature. According to Hegel, this formula “is reduced to
empty formalism, and moral science is converted into mere rhetoric about duty
for duty’s sake.” That is, it does not offer a clear guideline for assessing
moral conduct, and it does not provide us with any specific moral duties that
we can follow. The crux of the problem, for Hegel, is that the categorical
imperative is a moral litmus test based on the absence or presence of a
contradiction. While this may sound good in the abstract, it is difficult to
detect contradictions within concrete actions that we know are contradictory.
Hegel gives two examples here:
The rule that there should be no
private property contains of itself no contradiction, nor does the proposition
that this or that particular nation or family should not exist, or that no one
should live at all. Only if it is really fixed and assumed that private
property and human life should exist and be respected, is it a contradiction to
commit theft or murder. [The Philosophy of Right, Sect. 135]
The first example is the claim that
“there should be no private property,” which is a position that we would all
want to reject. Even communists or religious monks who take vows of poverty
recognize that we have at least some private property, such as our toothbrushes
and the clothes that we wear. But, Hegel argues, wherein lies the contradiction
when making this claim? The second example is that a particular nation, family,
or even the entire human race should not exist at all. At its worst, this claim
would mean that genocide and even omnicide the killing of all humans would be
morally permissible. Where, though, is the inherent contradiction in this
claim? According to Hegel, in the absence of any clear contradiction, there is
no way of ruling this out, and “all manner of wrong and immoral acts may be by
such a method justified.”
What can we say in defense of Kant? First, it is important to recognize that,
with any moral principle, there will be a gap between how it appears as an
abstract statement, and how we apply it in concrete situations. Take a basic
abstract moral principle like “don’t harm others”. The challenge here is
determining what counts as harm, and how serious that harm must be before it
becomes morally wrong. Suppose that my hands are dirty, and I shake hands with
you. You don’t want the grime that’s just been transferred onto your hands and
have to wash them off, taking up one minute of your life and costing you one
cent in hand soap. Does the harm here rise to the level of immorality? Probably
not, but somehow we must decide whether the abstract principle “don’t harm others”
applies in this particular case. Applying Kant’s Categorical Imperative in
concrete situations may also be challenging, but this is a challenge that is
built into the application of any general moral principle.
Second, Kant provides enough examples to demonstrate how we apply the
categorical imperative in concrete situations, particularly using the litmus
test of detecting a contradiction. The example of deceitful promises is a
perfect illustration of how an immoral maxim may produce an internal
contradiction when universalized. If we universally allow deceitful promises,
this means that we may (1) keep our word and (2) not keep our word at the same
time. This is as explicit a contradiction as one can get. Other immoral maxims
don’t lead to explicit internal contradictions like this, and,
instead, Kant tries to show how they lead to external contradictions.
We’ve seen that external contradictions occur between (1) the proposed
universal rule and (2) another inherent rational obligation. For example, it is
wrong to waste my talents since it is contrary to my inherent rational
obligation to develop my talents. It is wrong to deny charity to others since
it is contrary to my inherent rational wish to receive charity when I am in
need.
For most other immoral actions that Kant does not specifically illustrate, it
is easiest to see these as involving external contradictions as well. Stealing
is wrong, perhaps, because it is contrary to our rational obligation to live in
peace with our neighbors. Murder is wrong, perhaps, because it is contrary to
our rational obligation to respect the lives of others. This applies equally to
Hegel’s example of genocide and omnicide, since these are contrary to our
rational obligation to respect human life. With Hegel’s other example, that of
prohibiting private property, this is contrary to our rational duty to take
care of our minds and bodies. Such care of ourselves requires that we have at
least some private property, just as, for example, a bird claims some type of
ownership of its nest.
C. Mill’s Criticism: The Categorical
Imperative Reduces to Utilitarianism
British philosopher John Stuart Mill
(1806–1873) developed a view of morality that was about as contrary to Kant’s
theory as one could imagine. Kant believed that our moral duties spring
immediately from human reason, without any consideration of the tangible
effects of our actions on our personal happiness. For Kant, the categorical
imperative is a method of directly accessing the commands of our reason,
independent of other considerations. By contrast, Mill believed that our moral
obligations spring only from considerations of how our actions affect human
happiness. Mill proposes his own principle of morality, which he calls the
“utilitarian principle”: “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”
According to this principle, we look at the consequences of our actions and
assess whether they bring about more happiness than unhappiness.
Mill was aware of Kant’s categorical imperative and the enormous influence that
Kant’s theory had on philosophers of the time. However, Mill argues that the
categorical imperative does not succeed as a purely rational source of
obligation. Instead, he says, it is actually a disguised version of the
utilitarian principle which is the very last thing that Kant thought his
principle was:
[Kant lays] down a universal first
principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: “So act,
that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all
rational beings.” But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the
actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there
would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in
the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of
conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption
would be such as no one would choose to incur. [Utilitariansim, 1]
Although Mill cites the general formula
of the categorical imperative in the above quote, he directs his attack against
the Formula of the Law of Nature, which tells us that an action is wrong if a
contradiction arises when universalizing the intended maxim. According to Mill,
the categorical imperative fails to reveal any such contradiction, and the only
thing it does reveal is that the consequences of universalizing a maxim involve
more unhappiness than happiness.
Part of Mill’s criticism sounds much like Hegel’s: the categorical imperative
fails as a moral litmus test since contradictions do not arise when
universalizing immoral actions. We’ve already seen how Kant can overcome
Hegel’s objection. But there is a second part to Mill’s criticism that is
potentially fatal to Kant’s theory: universalization isn’t about rational conflicts;
it’s about envisioning good or bad consequences. Suppose I tell you that I’m
going to cheat on my taxes, and in response you say “what if everyone did
that?” My natural inclination to your question is to envision the disastrous
effects this would have on the country, and then hopefully conclude that I
should have nothing to do with that. Kant, though, is telling me that I’m looking
at the issue of universalization improperly. I should ignore the harmful
consequences of universalized tax evasion, and, instead, hunt for a
contradiction, either internal or external. But this is a tough task to
accomplish. It requires a college course in ethics to understand what it means
for universalized maxims to be “contradictory”, and Kant’s examples of exposing
contradictions are not obvious. Thus, Kant’s conception of universalization is
unnatural, difficult to grasp, and probably impossible to follow in real life
situations. Although Kant thinks that universalization merely involves looking
for the presence of a contradiction, according to Mill we are actually
envisioning the unpleasant effects of a universalized rule.
How might Kant respond to Mill’s criticism? The short answer is that Kant is in
fact trying to rescue the moral principle of universalization from the
distorted ways that consequentialists like Mill have been using it. Kant would
probably agree that universalized tax evasion would have bad effects on
society. That is just a natural side effect of widespread deceit. What Kant is
saying, though, is that harmful effects do not make actions
immoral. There is something inherently wrong with the actions themselves
because they conflict with our rational intuitions about moral duty. We must
reject the whole tendency to link morality with consequences. If
universalization is only about envisioning consequences, then universalization
must be rejected as a moral guideline. But Kant is trying to salvage our common
tendency to connect universalization and morality when we ask the question
“what if everyone did that?” Yes, Kant’s view of universalization is a bit odd,
but it’s better than rejecting the entire conception of universalization
because of its faulty connection with consequences. Universalization still can
be an important moral litmus test, in spite of its tainted history.
D. Anscombe’s Criticism: There Is No
Procedure for Constructing Maxims
In a famous essay entitled “Modern
Moral Philosophy” (1958), contemporary British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe
criticizes virtually the entire lineup of traditional moral philosophers. With
regard to Kant, she argues that Kant’s “rule about universalizable maxims is
useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description
of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.” That is, for any
action I pick, I could devise a wide variety of maxims that might represent my
action. But how do I know which one is the correct maxim? To illustrate
Anscombe’s criticism, we will use a rather grotesque example that Kant himself
discusses. Suppose I yank out one of my healthy teeth and sell it to a dentist,
who will then insert it into someone else’s mouth. We would expect any adequate
moral theory to condemn this action. So, if Kant is correct, universalizing
this action should generate a contradiction. But what is the maxim of my action
here? It might be that “I should pull out my tooth and sell it to a dentist,”
or that “I should extract a healthy part of my body and sell it,” or that “I
should pull out my right upper molar and sell it to a dentist by the name of
John Smith.” Each of these maxims has entirely different implications, and if I
cannot figure out exactly which maxim represents my action, then I cannot test
the action by universalizing it. So, Kant’s categorical imperative fails to
give us the guidance that we need.
In defense of Kant, Anscombe’s criticism misses the point about what a “maxim”
is, and Kant really does provide an appropriate way to construct maxims. The
key to constructing a maxim is to determine the intention behind
an action. Kant illustrates the connection between maxims and intentions here:
Every immoral man has his maxims May a
man, for instance, mutilate his body for profit? May he sell a tooth? May he
surrender himself at a price to the highest bidder? . . . What is the intent in
these cases? It is to gain material advantage. [Lectures, “The Supreme
Principle of Morality]
Kant is correct that, if we want to
understand the moral worth of someone’s action, we must look beyond the
specific action and examine the underlying intention. For example, if I hit a
pedestrian while driving my car, from a moral standpoint it makes a big difference
whether I was hoping to hit or to avoid the pedestrian. Just as it is important
to discover one’s underlying intention in moral assessments, it is also
important in criminal law, especially in determining the severity of
punishment. Today, we don’t speak about the maxim of our
actions but prefer to speak simply about our intention. However,
philosophers in Kant’s time were comfortable viewing intentions as maxims.
Wolff, for example, writes that “man must have certain maxims or general rules
according to which he directs his action, even if he himself does not clearly
recognize this.”
In constructing my maxim, then, I look to my intention. In the case of the
extracted tooth, my intention is, in Kant’s words, “to gain material
advantage.” The more precisely stated maxim is that “I should disfigure myself
by extracting my tooth to gain material advantage.” In the spirit of Anscombe’s
criticism, we must acknowledge that it is sometimes difficult to uncover the
exact intention behind our actions, but that’s a problem that plagues morality
in general, and not just Kant’s theory. In criminal court cases, prosecutors
and defense attorneys may battle for days over a defendant’s true underlying
intention. It may not be any easier for us as individuals when we struggle to
discover why we do things. In fact, Kant believes that it is nearly impossible
to discover our precise intentions:
We can never, even by the strictest
examination, get completely behind the secret incentives of action; since, when
the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we
are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see. [Foundations,
2]
Although I may not know what my exact
intentions are for a given action, I can make a best guess or even consider a
few possible intentions just to cover all the bases. With the categorical
imperative, then, I may have to devise a few maxims and see what the outcome of
each would be when universalized. This adds extra steps to the categorical
imperative, but they are steps that realistically reflect our limited knowledge
of our intentions.
Conclusion
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral
requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical
Imperative” . Immorality thus involves a violation of the categorical
imperative and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and
Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of
rationality. However, these standards were either desire based instrumental
principles of rationality or based on
rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis
of practical reason will reveal only the requirement that rational agents must
conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that conformity to the
Categorical imperative (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral
requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational
agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will
must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being the author of the
law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality is none other than the
law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a
conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of
a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this
self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds
for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect.