The Paradox of Freedom: The Self, Society, and the Teleological End

 Roberto B. Natividad, LPT, MBA

Divine Word College of Laoag

Abstract

This article explores the fundamental paradox of human freedom, the tension between the individual's inherent autonomy and the necessity of social and spiritual accountability. Drawing upon the philosophical traditions from the Medieval era (Aquinas) through the Enlightenment (Hobbes, Kant) to the existential critiques of the Nineteenth Century (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Scheler), this analysis synthesizes diverse views on selfhood, morality, and social control. The discussion is structured around three critical poles: the self as a project of radical autonomy (Kierkegaard’s subjectivity), the self as a subject of social determinism (Hobbes’ Leviathan and Marx’s critique), and the self as a relational and teleological being (Scheler’s Ordo Amoris and the Islamic view of accountability). The core argument posits that authentic selfhood is achieved not through isolation or the rejection of all constraints, but through the responsible affirmation of one’s unique destiny, anchored by moral duty and divine purpose.

Keywords: Selfhood, Freedom, Categorical Imperative, Ordo Amoris, Social Control, Authenticity, Determinism, Teleology

I. Introduction

A. Concern (Problem Statement)

The fundamental concern addressed in this article is the crisis of identity and moral certainty in the face of modern pluralism. Is the individual truly free, or is human action predetermined by external forces—whether biological, social, or historical? The discussion critically evaluates the tension between the self as an autonomous creator of values (e.g., Nietzsche) and the self as a relational being bound by inherent moral law and social necessity (e.g., Aquinas and Kant). Furthermore, the work probes the dangers of not being a self, particularly through "wearing a mask" or "absorption in a function," where the unique personal destiny is forfeited to conformity.

B. Purpose of Writing

The purpose of this article is to synthesize divergent philosophical anthropologies to construct a comprehensive, integrated understanding of the human person. It aims to clarify the pathways to authentic selfhood by contrasting views on morality, knowledge, and existence, ultimately seeking a coherent framework that honors both human freedom and spiritual accountability.

C. Objective of Writing

The objectives of this analysis are threefold:

1.      To delineate the philosophical arguments for and against human freedom, using the works of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

2.      To analyze the ethical systems (Utilitarianism, Categorical Imperative, Non-Formal Ethics of Value) that define moral action.

3.      To propose a model of selfhood rooted in relatedness and historical destiny, demonstrating that authentic personhood is achieved through responsible involvement rather than isolated reflection.

II. The Battleground of Freedom and Determinism

A. Radical Autonomy vs. The Will to Power

The Nineteenth Century challenged the foundational certainties of the West. Søren Kierkegaard introduced existentialism, asserting that “subjectivity is truth.” Truth, for him, is not an objective fact to be discovered, but a personal, passionate commitment. This perspective liberates the self from abstract systems but burdens it with the responsibility of decision-making, leading to dread (or anxiety) in the face of unforeseen outcomes.

Similarly, Frederick Nietzsche declared “God is dead,” not as a theological statement, but as a cultural observation that the source of objective morality had collapsed. He criticized Western values (Christianity and democracy) as "slave morality"—advocating pity and equality—and called for the emergence of the Übermensch, a master who creates his own values reflecting strength and independence. This is the ultimate expression of human self-creation, where man is the creator of values.

B. The Constraints of Will and Necessity

Contrasting this radical autonomy are the arguments for determinism and the inevitable constraints on the will. Arthur Schopenhauer, the great pessimist, saw life as a tragedy driven by the futile, irrational Will to Live, which leads only to suffering and constant wishing without satisfaction. The only respite is the temporary cessation of this will.

Baruch Spinoza offers a more nuanced determinism: freedom is not the ability to say "no" to necessity, but the ability to say "yes" through understanding (Deus sive Natura). Real freedom means acting according to the necessary nature of man, achieved through the "intellectual love of God" and the mastery of emotions through reason. The external world is governed by immutable laws, and human freedom lies only in realizing this necessity.

C. The Foundation of Moral Duty

The moral dimension of freedom is most rigorously addressed by Immanuel Kant. His Categorical Imperative (CI) demands that moral action be universalizable (what if everyone did this?) and that we treat persons as ends and never merely as means. This principle establishes morality not on feelings (Scheler) or consequences (Bentham), but on unconditional duty. An action is moral only if it stems from respect for the moral law, even if it is against our self-interest. This duty establishes a framework where every person is affirmed as a rational, autonomous being worthy of respect.

III. Selfhood: The Dynamic and Relational Person

A. Rejecting the Objective Self

The search for selfhood begins by rejecting the Path of Objectivity (Section 5.2.1). To ask "What am I?" and answer with generalities (e.g., "a rational animal") fails to capture the unique, unrepeatable essence of "Who am I?" Thinking of the self as a static thing or object distorts its true character, which is:

1.      Dynamic and Always Changing (Conversion): The self is constantly in a process of becoming, not fixed in a state of being.

2.      Relational: Unlike an isolated object, the self is caught up in relationships (family, career, God), which are essential for its existence.

B. The Priority of Love (Ordo Amoris)

In counterpoint to Kant's formalism, Max Scheler argues that the human heart, the "seat of love," accounts for the essence of human existence (ens amans). For Scheler, feelings and love have a logic of their own and are conjoined to experiences of value. His "ordo amoris" (order of love) suggests that values are ranked and intuitively "felt" before they are rationally chosen. The moral act is founded in the heart's spontaneous "leaning" toward a higher value (pre-rational "preferring"), with the value of the holy/divine at the apex, superseding sensible, pragmatic, and life values. This shows that the moral life is lived primarily from the heart's deep order, not from a rationally contrived set of external rules.

C. The Person as Relatedness and Historical Destiny

The subjective self is best understood as relatedness and historical destiny (Sections 7.5-7.6). I am a product of my past, yet I move decisively in the present toward my future goals and vocation.

·         Relatedness: My existence as a person is owed to the people in my life (family, friends, God). A true personal relationship is a living dialogue that recognizes the other as a unique subject endowed with unconditional worth (not an object of use or judgment). This relationship gives continuous support and an added dimension of meaning to my life.

·         Purpose (Teleology): Selfhood is not just being, but becoming what I am "meant to be." This purpose is found in the "reaching out"—the involvement with career, causes, and commitments that ultimately define my existence. As a person of faith, this destiny is inherently tied to my vocation and participation in the divine love (Scheler).

IV. Society and the Fulfillment of the Person

A. Social Contract and Fulfillment

Though society can be pictured as oppressive, man chooses to live in it because it represents full human existence (Section 8.3). The social contract—the compromise of freedom for security—raises life above a merely animal level. Society contributes to the fulfillment of man by providing:

1.      Communication and Morality: We learn language, morality, and right ways to relate through social interaction (the jungle boy analogy).

2.      Source of Meaning: Meaning is derived from relationships, values, and roles (mother, teacher, leader). These roles, though determined by social context, provide a sense of purpose and structure.

B. The Danger of Alienation

The Marxist critique, however, offers a powerful counterpoint: society, under a capitalist structure, becomes a source of alienation. Karl Marx viewed the essence of man as the ensemble of social relationships, not the individual. He argued that the modern industrial worker is alienated from the product of his labor and from his own species-being. In this critique, religion acts as the "opium of the people," dulling the pain of real suffering and preventing the oppressed from seeing the necessity of revolutionary change. Marx preferred freedom not only from capitalism but also from God and religion, visualizing a human world created solely for material prosperity.

C. Reconciling Freedom and Order (The Theological Imperative)

The final reflection on social control resolves the tension: while society is imperfect (Section 8.3.3) and its structures can impose limits, rules are not inherently evil. When rooted in justice, love, and the dignity of the human person (Kant/Aquinas), they serve to protect life and direct freedom toward the common good. The choice of who controls one’s life—God, society, or the self—must be answered by the independent, God-fearing, and family-oriented person who affirms God’s sovereignty while exercising responsible freedom within the context of relationship.

V. Conclusion

The self is an irreducible paradox: a unique subject who achieves freedom not by escaping responsibility, but by wholeheartedly embracing it. Authentic selfhood is the continuous, historical process of becoming—a process where the individual courageously:

1.      Affirms Identity: Rejects the safety of the mask or the limits of a single function.

2.      Chooses Purpose: Directs life toward its teleological end (vocation/calling).

3.      Acts Morally: Governs actions not by pleasure or utility (Bentham), but by duty and genuine compassion (Kant/Schopenhauer).

4.      Lives Relationally: Grounds identity in authentic love (ordo amoris) and accountability to God and others.

The profound philosophical and theological task remains to navigate these competing demands, ensuring that the necessary structures of society serve to realize, not suffocate, the divine potential inherent in the human person.

References

(Simulated APA 7th Edition Format)

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